TRADITIONS IN THE ANCIENT SCHOOLS OF LAW. 25

to refute it.¹ In later times, however, the idea took root in the Māliki school; Khattābi (quoted in Zurqāni, ii. 169) makes the continuous practice of the first three Caliphs a criterion for choosing between conflicting traditions, and 'Iyād (quoted ibid. i. 248) gives an argument e silentio from the first four Caliphs, in order to show that a certain tradition from the Prophet does not contain a general ruling but refers to a personal privilege of his.

The two particular authorities of the Medinese among the Companions are 'Umar and Ibn 'Umar. The role of 'Umar as a main authority of the Medinese is explicitly stated in many passages in Tr. III, for instance in § 87: 'You reply: If something is related from 'Umar, one does not ask why and how, and one does not counter it by interpreting the Koran differently.' The doctrine that a decision of 'Umar ought to prevail over a tradition from the Prophet, is expressed in a Medinese tradition which reflects the discussions in the generation before Mālik: Shāfi'ī—Mālik—Zuhri—Muhammad b. 'Abdallah b. Hārith b. Naufal—Sa'd b. Abī Waqqās and Ḍahhāk b. Qais differed on the practice of tamattu' at the pilgrimage; Ḍahhāk disapproved of it, and Sa'd blamed him; Ḍahhāk referred to 'Umar's prohibition, Sa'd to the example of the Prophet. Mālik prefers the opinion of Ḍahhāk, because 'Umar would be better informed about the Prophet than Sa'd. Shāfi'ī tries to minimize and to explain away 'Umar's order (Tr. III, 39).²

Ibn 'Umar is still known to Maqrīzī (ii. 332) as the main authority of the Medinese. His role appears from numerous polemical passages in Tr. III, such as: 'You neglect the tradition from the Prophet on the strength of an analogy based on the opinion of Ibn 'Umar, and say: 'Ibn 'Umar cannot be ignorant of the doctrine of the Prophet" (§ 119); 'we find that you are indignant at the thought of ever differing from Ibn 'Umar' (§ 145 (a)).³