Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence

12. SHĀFI'I AND LEGAL TRADITIONS

his early treatises, and in other instances it can be inferred from later information. But these are exceptions, and on the whole Shāfi'ī's doctrine on this point is as consistent as he claims it to be. His development from a natural acceptance of the Medinese doctrine in which he grew up, to the systematic acceptance of the traditions from the Prophet, is reflected in Ris. 38 where he tells how he learned a certain formula in his youth from his masters, later heard the isnād which belonged to it and which carried it back to the Caliph 'Umar, and finally heard his companions [that is, the traditionists] relate different forms on the authority of the Prophet.

The main text, in which Shāfi'ī puts forward his theory of traditions, is Tr. III, directed against the Medinese. He begins by stating his case: 'Every tradition related by reliable persons as going back to the Prophet, is authoritative and can be rejected only if another authoritative tradition from the Prophet contradicts it; if it is a case of repeal of a former ordinance by a later, the later is accepted; if nothing is known about a repeal, the more reliable of the two traditions is to be followed; if both are equally reliable, the one more in keeping with the Koran and the remaining undisputed parts of the sunna of the Prophet is to be chosen; traditions from other persons are of no account in the face of a tradition from the Prophet, whether they confirm or contradict it; if the other persons had been aware of the tradition from the Prophet, they would have followed it' (Tr. III, Introd.). Shāfi'ī repeats and elaborates this statement, the second half of which is particularly important, with tedious monotony.

It is significant that Shāfi'ī insists on these repeated statements of a principle which was to become a commonplace later, when discussing problems on which he and the Medinese follow the same traditions from the Prophet. The battle is joined in earnest when Shāfi'ī comes to those numerous cases where the Medinese set aside traditions from the Prophet in favour of traditions from other persons. He confesses that he has tried hard to find an excuse which would justify this procedure in his own eyes or in the eyes of any other scholar, but has been unable to find it. This, he says, applies only to traditions transmitted by reliable persons, but these must be accepted unquestioningly, and no tradition from the Prophet can be set