ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST TRADITIONS 49

A further method of invalidating traditions by interpretation was to regard them as referring to personal privileges of the Prophet. This method, which is a special case of the one discussed in the preceding paragraph, is refuted, and therefore supposed to exist, in two traditions. In one of them (Muw. ii. 89; Muw. Shaib. 178) the Prophet declares explicitly that a certain practice is no special privilege of his and says: 'I hope that I am the most god-fearing and the most learned among you.' According to the other (Muw. ii. 92; Muw. Shaib. 180), a man sends his wife to consult Umm Salama, a wife of the Prophet, on a certain practice; Umm Salama replies that the Prophet has this practice, but the man is all the more dejected because the Prophet has special privileges, and sends his wife again; the Prophet declares angrily that he is more mindful of Allah's orders than anyone. There is a further tradition about this particular case (Muw. ii. 94) which presents the anti-traditionist tendency directly. In this version 'A'isha declares that the Prophet had indeed the practice in question, but adds: 'The Prophet kept himself more under control than all of you.'

Both Iraqians and Medinese used this method of assuming a personal privilege on the part of the Prophet, and the traditionists themselves adopted it when they wanted to invalidate a tradition which contradicted their own. Shafi'i's reply is always the same: 'If one started that line of reasoning, there would be no end to it ... and the sunnas would be whittled away' (Tr. IX, 39).

There is further the assumption that actions of the Prophet as reported in traditions represent only his personal taste or preference.¹ The idea that one ought to follow the Prophet even in his personal tastes was as yet unknown to Shafi'i, though it had already found expression before him.²

These examples are not meant to be exhaustive, but are sufficient to show the importance of anti-traditionist interpretations in the period before Shafi'i.

We have seen in Chapter 4 that the ancient schools of law based their doctrines, generally speaking, on traditions going