18 SHĀFI'I AND LEGAL TRADITIONS

except from his own words (Ikh. 325). The tradition of a Companion from the Prophet must prevail over the differing action of the same Companion (Tr. II, 3 (i)).

Shāfi‘ī’s own reasoning does not always reach this standard. But no sacrifice of principle is involved when he argues ad hominem from traditions from Companions against the representatives of the ancient schools.¹

On the other hand, Shāfi‘ī does not hesitate to use traditions from Companions as additional evidence besides information from the Prophet on his sunna. This is sometimes meant also as an argument ad hominem, but mostly not, and it plays indeed a considerable part in Shāfi‘ī’s reasoning in Tr. I, Tr. II, Tr. III, and elsewhere. Occasionally Shāfi‘ī uses traditions from the first four Caliphs, or from Companions and from later authorities, in order to show, in the style of the ancient schools of law, the continuity of doctrine from the time the Prophet gave his ruling or performed his model action. Apart from this Shāfi‘ī often uses traditions from Companions as authorities in cases where no traditions from the Prophet are available.² He says explicitly: ‘As long as there exists a ruling in Koran and sunna, those who are aware of it have but to follow them; if it does not exist, we turn to the opinion of the Companions of the Prophet or of one of them, and we prefer the opinion of the Caliphs: Abū Bakr, ‘Umar or ‘Uthmān. . . .³ If no opinion is available from the Caliphs, the other Companions of the Prophet have a sufficient status in religion to justify us in following their opinion, and we ought rather to follow them than those who come after them.’⁴

This reference to the opinions of the Companions is called taqlīd.⁵ It was common to Shāfi‘ī and to the ancient schools of law, and while Shāfi‘ī, as a matter of principle, subordinated