96   CONSENSUS AND DISAGREEMENT  

period. It relates that it was suggested to 'Umar b. 'Abdal'azīz to bring about uniformity of doctrine; but he said: 'I should not like it if they had not disagreed,' and sent letters to the several provinces ordering that each region should decide according to the consensus of its scholars.¹ On the side of the Iraqians, the Fiqh Akbar expresses the doctrine that disagreements in the community are a concession from Allah.²

These two groups of evidence are not necessarily contradictory, and both tendencies expressed by them are complementary to the concept of consensus in the ancient schools of law. On one side, they accept the geographical differences of doctrine as natural; on the other, they uphold their consensus, disparage irregular opinions which are apt to break it,³ and state unambiguously what they consider to be right. The rising tide of traditions from the Prophet in particular threatened the continuity and uniformity of doctrine; so Shāfi'ī rightly connected the rejection of 'isolated traditions' by the ancient schools with their aversion to disagreement (Tr. IV, 258). The adherents of the ancient schools logically insisted that a qualified lawyer (mujtahid)⁴ might be wrong in his conclusions (ibid. 274). Against the underlying attitude to error and disagreement is directed a tradition to which Shāfi'ī refers in his reply and which makes the Prophet say: 'If a mujtahid is right he receives two rewards, and if he is mistaken he receives one reward.'

The isnād of this tradition (Tr. IV, 275 and Ris. 67, where further details of this discussion are recorded) runs: Shāfi'ī—'Abdal'azīz b. Muhammad-Yazīd b. 'Abdallāh b. Had—Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm Taimī-Busr b. Sa'īd-Abū Qais—'Amr b. 'Āṣ—Prophet, and after giving the text, Yazīd claims that he mentioned this tradition to Abū Bakr b. Muhammad b. 'Amr b. Ḥazm, who confirmed it on the authority of Abū Salama b. 'Abdalrahmān—Abū Ḥuraira. This kind of artificial confirmation is typical of the first appearance