2 THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF MUHAMMADAN LAW

of Muhammadan law, he did not say the last word with regard either to consensus or to analogy. Analogy was the last of the four principles to gain explicit recognition, and even after Shāfi‘ī’s time had to overcome much negative resistance and positive disapproval; the history of this process has been studied by Goldziher in one of his fundamental works which also contains an analysis of Shāfi‘ī’s contribution to legal theory.¹ As regards consensus, Snouck Hurgronje has made clear its all-important function as the ultimate mainstay of legal theory and of positive law in their final form:² the consensus guarantees the authenticity and correct interpretation of the Koran, the faithful transmission of the sunna of the Prophet, the legitimate use of analogy and its results; it covers, in short, every detail of the law, including the recognized differences of the several schools. Whatever is sanctioned by consensus is right and cannot be invalidated by reference to the other principles. Thus the classical doctrine, but we shall find that for Shāfi‘ī consensus played a much more modest part. It is easy to see that the element of retrospective guarantee embodied in the classical doctrine of consensus is hardly compatible with the free movement and violent conflict of opinions, such as we witness in the creative period of Muhammadan law to which Shāfi‘ī belongs.

We are therefore left, as far as Shāfi‘ī and his predecessors and contemporaries are concerned, with two recognized material sources, the Koran and the sunna. We may take the importance of the Koranic element in Muhammadan law for granted, though we shall have to qualify this for the earliest period;³ but for Shāfi‘ī the sunna takes a place comparable to that filled by the consensus in the later system. It is one of the main results of the first part of this book, that Shāfi‘ī was the first lawyer to define sunna as the model behaviour of the Prophet, in contrast with his predecessors for whom it was not necessarily connected with the Prophet, but represented the traditional, albeit ideal, usage of the community, forming their ‘living tradition’ on an equal footing with customary or generally agreed practice. For Shāfi‘ī, therefore, only the actions of the Prophet carry authority, and he admits on principle only traditions from the Prophet