CONSENSUS AND DISAGREEMENT  95

endeavour to erect the traditions from the Prophet, instead of the 'living tradition' and the consensus, into the highest authority in law was short-lived.

G. DISAGREEMENT

Shāfi'ī states repeatedly that the ancient schools of law are hostile to disagreement.¹ So are, according to Ibn Qutaiba, 7, the ahl al-kalam. The followers of the ancient schools refer to Koranic passages, such as sura iii. 105; xcviii. 4, where Allah blames disagreement in matters of religion; they refuse to concede any kind of disagreement and say that had the old authorities met, they would have come to an agreement by convincing one another (Tr. IV, 261). There is also a tradition which makes Ibn Mas'ūd conform to a practice which does not correspond to his doctrine, and when this is pointed out to him say: 'Disagreement is bad.'²

Hostility to disagreement, on the ground of administrative convenience, was voiced by Ibn Muqaffa', a secretary of state.³ He pointed out the wide divergencies in jurisprudence and in administration of justice existing between the several great cities and between the schools of law such as the Iraqians and the Hijazis. These divergencies, he said, either perpetuated different local precedents⁴ or came from systematic reasoning, which was sometimes faulty or pushed too far. The Caliph should review the different doctrines with their reasons and codify and enact his own decisions in the interest of uniformity. This code ought to be revised by successive Caliphs. These considerations of Ibn Muqaffa' lie quite outside the compass of the ancient lawyers and traditionists; they are obviously influenced by Persian administrative tradition.

On the other hand, we find Medinese traditions in favour of disagreement and against uniformity. One of these traditions expresses the reaction of the Medinese to an extreme proposal such as that of Ibn Muqaffa', projected back into the Umaiyad