92 CONSENSUS AND DISAGREEMENT  

in his own and in the preceding generation. Shāfi'ī denies its existence on questions of detail, which are the concern of specialists, in Medina, and still more in the community at large. The consensus of the majority of those scholars on whom one happens to possess information cannot be used as an argument, and no inference may be drawn regarding the opinion of those scholars of whom nothing is known.¹

In Tr. III, 129, Shāfi'ī maintains the authority of the consensus of the community at large: 'It is impossible that the community should agree on something contrary to the words of the Prophet.' In § 148 (p. 244), he gives his theory in detail. No consensus, whether of the Companions or of the Successors or of the generation after them, can be validly claimed on questions of detail. 'Q.: How can you validly claim consensus at all? A.: It can be validly claimed with regard to duties that no one may neglect, such as prayers, zakat tax, and the prohibition of what is forbidden. But as regards questions concerning specialists, the ignorance of which does not harm the great public and the knowledge of which is to be found with specialists . . . , we can only say one of two things: if we are not aware that they have disagreed, we say so, and if they have disagreed we say that they have done so. ... We follow whichever of their opinions is more in keeping with Koran and sunna. If there is no such indication-and this is rarely the case-then . . . [we follow] the one which is considered better in all its implications by the scholars. If they disagree as described, it is correct to say: [opinions on] this problem are related from a number of persons who disagree, and we follow the opinion of three against that of two, or of four against that of three; but we do not claim that this is a consensus, because to claim a consensus is to make a statement about those who have not expressed an opinion. . . .² The consensus comprises the greatest possible number of different groups of people.' Shāfi'ī insists on strict unanimity (ibid., p. 248): 'If the contrary opinion were related only from one or two or three, one could not say that men are agreed, because they are divided. ... I do not claim consensus unless no one denies that it exists.'

In numerous passages, however, Shāfi'ī uses the old concept of the consensus of the majority of scholars as a subsidiary argument or an argument ad hominem against the Medinese. But he explicitly rejects