TRADITIONS IN THE ANCIENT SCHOOLS OF LAW 27

[that is, a tradition from the Prophet].^' The Medinese presume that when the Successor Ibn Musaiyib gave an opinion, 'he would not have done so unless it were based on his knowledge of an authority for his doctrine' (Tr. III, 77). But traditions from Successors are not followed automatically. The main Medinese authorities in the generation of the Successors will be discussed later.¹

B. THE IRAQIANS

The Iraqians were alleged by their opponents to care little for traditions, or at least less than the Medinese, and a slightly modified form of this view has remained part of the present common opinion. But the contemporary texts show that this is not so. We have seen that it is not the Iraqians but the Medinese that Shafi'i charges with neglecting much of the little that they transmit². In more than one passage, the Iraqians show themselves more knowledgeable on traditions than the Medinese or the Syrians, and Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf are both ahead of Malik in the systematic collection of traditions.³ Against this, it is without importance that Shafi'i in an isolated passage taunts the Iraqians with deriving their knowledge of traditions from remote sources and possessing nothing like the knowledge of his companions the Medinese.⁴

The argument that the opinions of their opponents are not based on traditions from the Prophet, is common to the Iraqians and the Medinese in their polemics against one another.⁵ We shall see from the following analysis that the attitude of the Iraqians to traditions is essentially the same as that of the Medinese, but that their theory is more developed.

According to Shafi'i, it is Shaibani's principle that no opinion on law is valid unless it is based on binding information⁶ or analogy (Tr. VIII, 3); a binding tradition, one from a Companion in the case in question, has precedence over analogy (Ikh. 117 f.); it is equally inexcusable to contradict the text of a tradition or to make a mistake in applying it (Ikh. 282).